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Our main aim in this paper is to show that constructing an adequate 
theory of communication involves going beyond Grice’s notion of speak-
er’s meaning. After considering some of the diffi culties raised by Grice’s 
three-clause defi nition of speaker’s meaning, we argue that the charac-
terisation of ostensive communication introduced in relevance theory 
can provide a conceptually unifi ed explanation of a much wider range 
of communicative acts than Grice was concerned with, including cases 
of both ‘showing that’ and ‘telling that’, and with both determinate and 
indeterminate import.
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1. Introduction
In Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Sperber and Wilson 1986; 
revised edition 1995) we put forward a number of novel ideas, several 
of which have been infl uential and others more controversial. However, 
there is one idea that we feel did not get the discussion it deserved. We 
proposed a characterisation of communication which, although inspired 
by Grice’s defi nition of speaker’s meaning, implied that speaker’s mean-
ing does not have the degree of unity or autonomy needed to make it the 
proper object of a philosophical defi nition or a scientifi c theory. Commu-
nication, on the other hand, or rather the kind of ‘ostensive’ communica-
tion that humans engage in, is such a proper object of inquiry. We ar-
gued that our account of communication does a better job of explaining 
how utterances are interpreted than a standard Gricean approach, and 
also makes good sense of our fuzzy intuitions about speaker’s meaning 
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without giving the notion an unduly important theoretical role. Here, 
we take up the issues again. In the fi rst part of the paper, we discuss 
some diffi culties with Grice’s notion of speaker’s meaning, and in the 
second part, we consider how to resolve them.
2. Diffi culties with Grice’s notion of speaker’s meaning
2.1 The continuum between meaning and showing
Grice was aware of two particular problems with the notion of speak-
er’s meaning. The fi rst, linked to his sharp distinction between natural 
and non-natural meaning, arises when one tries to separate ‘meaning 
that’ from ‘displaying direct evidence that’1 in cases like the following 
(Grice 1989: 109):
(a) Herod, showing Salome the head of St. John the Baptist, cannot, 
I think, be said to have meant that St. John the Baptist was dead.
(b) Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation)
In (b) the displayer could mean (1) that he cannot play squash
Or (dubiously) (2) that he had a bad leg
     (the bandage might be fake)
But not  (3) that the leg is bandaged.
In discussing case (a), Grice comments:
Herod intended to make Salome believe that St. John the Baptist was dead 
and no doubt also intended Salome to recognise that he intended her to be-
lieve that St. John the Baptist was dead… Yet I certainly do not think that 
we should want to say that we have here [a case] of meaningNN … What we 
want to fi nd is the difference between, for example, ‘deliberately and openly 
letting someone know’ and ‘telling’ ... (1989: 218).
Grice’s solution was to add a third clause to his defi nition of utterer’s 
meaning. In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must 
intend the addressee 
(1) to produce a particular response r
(2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)
(3) to fulfi l (1) on the basis of his fulfi lment of (2),
where (3) is understood as stipulating that the addressee’s recognition 
of the utterer’s intention in (1) must be “at least part of his reason for 
producing r, and not merely the cause of his producing r” (Grice 1989: 
92). Despite some debate in the literature about whether this third 
clause was needed (Schiffer 1972; Vlach 1981; Recanati 1986; Bach 
1987; Neale 1992; Wharton 2009), it remained central to Grice’s later 
discussions of meaning and his distinction between natural and non-
natural meaning (Grice 1989: 290–97, 349–59).
1 Of course, if a reliable speaker both says that P and means it, this is evidence 
that P. However, it is indirect evidence (in the sense in which we want to make the 
direct/indirect distinction here) in that the content of the evidence depends on the 
interpretation of the communicator’s meaning, and the force of the evidence depends 
on the communicator’s trustworthiness.
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In characterising ostensive communication, we built on the fi rst two 
clauses of Grice’s defi nition and dropped the third. This was not be-
cause we were willing to broaden the defi nition of utterer’s meaning—
we agreed with Grice that talk of ‘meaning’ is awkward in certain cas-
es—but because it seemed obvious that there is a continuum of cases 
between ‘meaning that’ (typically achieved by the use of language) and 
‘displaying evidence that’ (in other words, showing), and we wanted our 
account of communication to cover both (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 46–
54). Grice’s example of the bandaged leg suggests how the continuum 
of cases can be constructed. The communicator wants the addressee to 
come to believe that P. In pure cases of showing, as in (b3), what is be-
ing shown provides suffi cient evidence for the addressee to believe that 
P, and the fact that the communicator intended him to believe that P 
does not even strengthen that evidence. In pure cases of meaning, as 
in an ordinary linguistic assertion, all the evidence that P is provided 
by the communicator’s giving overt evidence of her intention that the 
addressee should believe that P (and it is good evidence provided that 
the addressee trusts her competence and honesty in the matter). But of 
course, the evidence can come both from whatever is displayed (either 
shown or uttered) and from what the communicator’s communicative 
behaviour indicates of her intention, as in (b1) and (b2).
When a piece of evidence is shown to an addressee, it is typically 
interpreted in the light of the fact that it is being shown. In Grice’s 
example (b), the bandage on the leg may in itself be only weak evidence 
that the communicator cannot play squash: as he puts it, the bandage 
may be “fake”, and the condition it covers may be quite compatible with 
playing squash. However, the fact that it is being shown in answer 
to the question suggests that the condition it conceals makes playing 
squash impossible, or at least undesirable. Thus, (b1) is neither a pure 
case of meaning nor a pure case of producing direct evidence. Make the 
evidence stronger, say by showing a cast instead of a bandage, and the 
addressee will arrive at the intended conclusion mostly, if not wholly, 
on the ground of what is shown.
We described (b3) above as a pure case of showing. Could show-
ing a bandaged leg ever ‘mean’ that the communicator has a bandaged 
leg (as some commentators have been willing to accept)? Suppose the 
showing was in response to the question, “Is your leg bandaged?”, how 
does this differ from simply answering “Yes”? One difference is that 
the addressee has to trust the communicator in the ‘yes’ case and not 
in the showing case. Suppose, then, that the communicator pulls up 
her long skirt just enough to show what could be the bottom of a large 
bandage, giving weak, inconclusive evidence that her leg is bandaged. 
Since some trust is needed to accept the intended conclusion, would 
this now be a case of meaning? There is, of course, a continuum of po-
sitions to which the communicator could pull up her skirt, exposing a 
little more of the bandage each time, until the fact that the leg is ban-
daged is perceptually beyond doubt. At each point, less trust would be 
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needed, exemplifying the continuum between meaning and displaying 
direct evidence.
Suppose Salome has never seen John the Baptist before, and is un-
able to recognise him. Then for her, seeing a severed head would not 
be compelling evidence that John is dead. When the head is shown to 
her by Herod, the evidence is stronger, because it is combined with 
recognition of his intention. This revised scenario seems to involve both 
direct and indirect evidence (i.e. both showing and meaning): Herod 
showed Salome that the person whose head he is displaying was dead, 
and meant that this person was John. Of course, Herod also overtly 
intended Salome to think that he was responsible for John’s death, and 
that he had had John killed to satisfy her wishes; since these were not 
wholly evidenced by John’s severed head, they must have been meant.
Perhaps Grice could have said that as long as recognition of the com-
municator’s intention plays a role—however small—in the addressee’s 
coming to the intended conclusion, the case is one of meaning. This 
seems to fi t with his stipulation, in the third clause of his defi nition, 
that the audience’s recognition of the utterer’s intention should be “at 
least part” of their reason for producing the intended response. It would 
follow that any case of ‘showing that’ in which the evidence for the in-
tended conclusion was less than decisive would have to be reclassifi ed 
as a case of ‘meaning that’. But surely, if the part played by recognition 
of the utterer’s intention can vary from 100% to less than 1%, then 
many, if not most, cases of showing a piece of evidence seem to involve 
meaning, and the common sense understanding of meaning, and of the 
distinction between showing that and meaning that, is lost. A more sen-
sible response would be to study the whole continuum—characterised 
by its two end points of pure meaning and pure showing—as such, and 
get rid of the third clause. However, this amounts either to extending 
the notion of speaker’s meaning way beyond what is intuitively recog-
nisable as such, or to demoting it from its central theoretical role to a 
loosely descriptive use that may nonetheless be adequate when dealing 
with fairly standard cases of linguistic communication.
2.2 The continuum between determinate and indeterminate ‘meaning’
A second diffi culty Grice was aware of with the notion of speaker’s 
meaning arises when one tries to complete a description of the form: 
“The speaker meant that ___”. As Grice recognised, it is not uncommon 
for at least part of the intended meaning to be less than fully deter-
minate, so that the best rendering of it may be an open disjunction of 
propositions, and hence not itself a proposition. As Grice put it (1989: 
39–40),
Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to 
be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Prin-
ciple is being observed, and since there may be various possible explana-
tions, a list of which may be open, the conversational implicature in such 
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cases will be an open disjunction of such specifi c explanations, and if the list 
of these is open, the implicatum will have just the kind of indeterminacy 
that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess.
But this is tantamount to saying that there are some cases of speaker’s 
meaning where “The speaker meant that ___” cannot be properly com-
pleted, not because the speaker failed to communicate a meaning, but 
because that meaning is not a proposition.2
We argued in Relevance that there is a continuum of cases from 
those where the communicator’s meaning is a proposition, or can be 
paraphrased as such, to those where it is not paraphrasable at all. At 
one end of the continuum are utterances such as the railway offi cial’s 
reply to the passenger’s inquiry below:
 Passenger: What time is the next train to Oxford?
 Railway offi cial: 12.48.
Assuming that he has spoken in a neutral tone of voice and with an 
impersonal facial expression, his meaning could be paraphrased as the 
proposition that the next train to Oxford leaves at 12.48, and nothing 
more. Add an urgent tone of voice or a warning look, and although his 
assertion would remain the same, part of the intended import would 
be rather less determinate: he might be implicating, for instance, that 
the train is about to leave, that the seats are fi lling up fast, that the 
platform is further away than the passenger might have thought, that 
the passenger’s estimated walking speed may not be enough to get her 
there on time, and so on. In that case, his meaning would be partly 
precise and partly vague.
With a hyperbole such as “I could kill for a glass of water”, some of 
the speaker’s words (e.g. “kill”, “glass”) are loosely used and no deter-
minate proposition is asserted. Despite this element of indeterminacy, 
it is easy to see roughly what she is implicating: for instance, that she 
is very thirsty, that she has an urgent need or desire for water, and/or 
that getting hold of some water is a top priority for her. Although her 
meaning is less than fully determinate, identifying it is unlikely to give 
ordinary addressees much pause for thought.
With a poetic metaphor such as “Juliet is the sun”, the speaker’s 
meaning comes closer to the ‘indeterminate’ end of the continuum, and 
has the type of vagueness Grice saw as best rendered by an open dis-
junction of propositions. As Stanley Cavell comments (1965/1976: 78),
2 In the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’, Grice described non-natural meanings as 
“conceptions or complexes which involve conceptions”, and suggested that it would 
be legitimate to ask “how conceptions enter the picture and whether what enters the 
picture is the conceptions themselves or their justifi ability” (Grice 1989: 350). This 
is very different from the picture normally presented in philosophy of language and 
linguistics.
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Romeo means that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day begins 
with her; that only in her nourishment can he grow. And his declaration 
suggests that the moon, which other lovers use as emblem of their love, 
is merely her refl ected light, and dead in comparison, and so on. … The 
‘and so on’ which ends my example of paraphrase is signifi cant. It registers 
what William Empson calls ‘the pregnancy of metaphors’, the burgeoning of 
meaning in them.
Vaguer still are non-verbal cases such as the following, taken from Rel-
evance (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 55):
Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the window 
overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter 
follows suit, there is no one particular good thing that comes to his atten-
tion: the air smells fresh, fresher than it did in town, it reminds him of their 
previous holidays, he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fi sh; all sorts of 
pleasant things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was apprecia-
tive, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have intended him to 
notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be able to pin down her inten-
tions any further.
We went on to comment,
Is there any reason to assume that her intentions were more specifi c? Is 
there a plausible answer, in the form of an explicit linguistic paraphrase, to 
the question, what does she mean? Could she have achieved the same com-
municative effect by speaking? Clearly not. (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 
55–6).
If asked what she intended to convey in this case, one of the best an-
swers Mary could give is that she wanted to share an impression with 
Peter. Thus, at one end of the paraphrasability continuum are cases 
where the speaker’s meaning is fully determinate, and at the other are 
those involving the communication of impressions, where the commu-
nicator’s meaning cannot be paraphrased without loss.
2.3 The two continua combined
In raising these two issues, in arguing that there is a continuum be-
tween meaning and producing direct evidence and that paraphrasabil-
ity is a matter of degree, we were not just being fi nicky: we were not 
making the trivial and boring point that there may be unclear, mixed 
or borderline cases along both dimensions. If that was the problem, a 
good theory of meaning and/or a good theory of showing could be used 
to arrive at theoretically-grounded decisions in unclear cases; and in-
deed, while awaiting the development of such good theories, one could 
ignore or idealize away fuzzy or borderline cases and investigate speak-
er’s meaning by focusing on prototypical cases: that is, one could go on 
with philosophical business as usual. But our point was that to do this 
would be to idealise away essential features of communication, raising 
questions about the appositeness of the resulting theories.
Let us call the overtly intended cognitive effect of a communicative 
act its intended import. We want to argue that the two dimensions of 
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intended import we are considering—meaning/showing and determi-
nate/indeterminate—are orthogonal. As we have seen, completing the 
description “X meant that ___” with a proposition is sometimes unprob-
lematic, sometimes impossible, and there is a continuum of cases in 
between. We will shortly demonstrate that the same point applies to 
“W showed that ____”. The two continua interact to yield a two dimen-
sional-space, with intended imports occurring anywhere in this space. 











Determinate meaning (vicinity of 1). An example would be the rail-
way offi cial’s reply “12.48” to the passenger’s question about the time of 
the next train to Oxford, spoken in a neutral tone with an impersonal 
facial expression. This is a case of pure meaning, since all the evidence 
for the intended import comes from the speaker’s intentions, and the 
meaning is determinate, since it is paraphrasable as a proposition. 
Most discussions of meaning in philosophy of language and linguistics 
focus exclusively on this type of case.
Semi-determinate meaning (vicinity of 2). An example would be 
the hyperbole “I could kill for a glass of water,” where the intended 
import is vaguer than with the railway offi cial’s reply “12.48”, but it 
is easy to see roughly what type of conclusions the addressee was in-
tended to derive. This is a case of meaning, since all the evidence for 
the intended conclusions is indirect, but the meaning is less than fully 
determinate.
Indeterminate meaning (vicinity of 3). With a poetic metaphor 
such as “Juliet is the sun”, the intended import is still vaguer, and is 
not paraphrasable as a proposition at all. This is again a case of mean-
ing, since all the evidence for the intended import is indirect, but it is 
closer to the ‘indeterminate’ end of the paraphrasability continuum.
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Determinate meaning/showing (vicinity of 4). When asked who is 
the tallest pupil in the class, the teacher points to an individual who 
at fi rst sight is the tallest in the class (although some pupils might be 
absent) and says, “He is.” She both means that the pupil she is point-
ing at is the tallest (since some of the evidence for the intended conclu-
sion comes from her intentions), and displays direct evidence that he 
is the tallest. In both cases, the intended import is paraphrasable as a 
proposition.
Semi-determinate meaning/showing (vicinity of 5). On a tourist 
trip, Mary points to the view and says “What a view!” Here, the linguis-
tic meaning of her utterance (combined with her tone of voice, facial 
expression etc.) indicates roughly what type of conclusions she expects 
the addressee to derive, but does not pin them down precisely, so the 
utterance falls towards the middle of the ‘determinate/indeterminate’ 
continuum. Moreover, the evidence for the intended conclusions comes 
both from Mary’s intentions and from what she has pointed out, so 
the utterance also falls towards the middle of the ‘meaning/showing’ 
continuum.
Indeterminate meaning/showing (vicinity of 6). On a tourist trip, 
Mary points to the view and says “Wow!” This time, the linguistic 
meaning of her utterance (to the extent that it has one) gives no more 
than a rough indication of the type of conclusions the addressee is be-
ing encouraged to derive, and the intended import is not paraphrasable 
as a proposition at all. In Grice’s terms, what Mary communicates is an 
open disjunction of propositions; in our terms (to be discussed further 
below), what she communicates is an impression.
Determinate showing (vicinity of 7). When asked for the time, 
Mary points to a clock showing the time as fi ve o’clock. Here, the in-
tended import is as determinate as if she had said “It’s fi ve o’clock”. 
However, the case is one of showing rather than meaning, since all the 
evidence for the intended conclusion comes from the clock itself, rather 
than from the fact that it has been pointed out.
Semi-determinate showing (vicinity of 8). Peter and Mary are out 
for a walk when she points to menacing clouds on the horizon. Here it is 
easy to see roughly what she intends to convey—that it may rain soon, 
that they should reassess their plans and maybe think about curtailing 
their walk—but the intended import is less than fully determinate.
Indeterminate showing (vicinity of 9). An example might be show-
ing pictures of one’s children. Here, there is no proposition that would 
complete the description “The communicator showed that ___”, and the 
intended import cannot be rendered as a proposition at all.
Notice that it is possible to mean and show the same thing, as when 
the teacher, asked who is the tallest pupil in the class, points to the 
tallest individual in the room and says “He is”. This allows us to handle 
a type of example that seems to be incompatible with the third clause 
of Grice’s defi nition of meaning, and led him to contemplate dropping 
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this clause entirely. When the communicator is producing a logical ar-
gument, she typically intends her audience to accept the conclusion 
of this argument not on her authority, but because it follows from the 
premises (this type of case is insightfully discussed by Schiffer 1972):
Conclusion of argument: p, q, therefore r (from already stated premises): 
While U[tterer] intends that A[ddressee] should think that r, he does not 
expect (and so intend) A to reach a belief that r on the basis of U’s intention 
that he should reach it. The premises, not trust in U, are supposed to do the 
work. (Grice 1989: 107).
Since the third clause was crucial to maintaining Grice’s distinction 
between ‘meaning that’ and ‘displaying direct evidence that’, he was 
reluctant to drop it. We would analyse this type of example as a case of 
determinate meaning/showing. The speaker provides both direct and 
indirect evidence that the conclusion follows from the premises: that is, 
she both means it and shows it.
There is another type of case that Grice did not discuss, but that 
does raise a serious problem for his distinction. Many utterances con-
tain deictic elements whose function is not just to specify a referent 
but also to specify conceptual content (the referent being a token that 
contributes to the interpretation a type to which it belongs). Compare, 
for instance:
To open a champagne bottle, you can do this (demonstrates how to open a 
champagne bottle by opening one)
To open a champagne bottle, you should do this (demonstrates how to open 
a champagne bottle by opening one)
The fi rst communicative act (comprising both the utterance and the 
demonstration) does not satisfy the third clause of Grice’s defi nition 
of speaker’s meaning, since the demonstration provides suffi cient evi-
dence of the fact that a bottle of champagne can be opened in the way 
demonstrated. By contrast, the second communicative act (where the 
only difference is that ‘can’ has been replaced by ‘should’) is a perfect 
case of Gricean speaker’s meaning, since the demonstration is not suf-
fi cient evidence for the normative claim. But of course the two acts are 
very similar in their communicative import, and should be analysed in 
very similar ways.
This example also illustrates the fact that deixis which helps to 
specify conceptual content is quite commonly a source of indetermi-
nacy. In a communicative act of this type, the demonstrative behaviour 
is merely indicative of what the speaker intends to convey. Some of its 
features should be replicated in future performances, and others not. 
As in most ‘how-to’ demonstrations, the movements are individually 
highlighted in a way that is useful to the demonstration, but not to 
the opening of a champagne bottle. This highlighting is not to be repli-
cated in future performances. Moreover, the demonstrator has her own 
idiosyncrasies—she may be left-handed, for instance—that need not be 
replicated either. To comprehend such a communicative act involves in-
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ferring the type of action of which the demonstration was an ostensive, 
and hence untypical, token, and understanding that the ‘this’ denotes 
the type. Quite commonly, such demonstrations are used because no 
perspicuous verbal description is available—in which case, the content 
communicated is not paraphrasable.
This example shows that not only meaning and showing but also de-
terminate and indeterminate aspects of the intended import can coexist 
in a communicative act. The co-occurrence of precise and vague import 
is also common in ordinary verbal communication, as when the railway 
offi cial’s reply “12.48” is accompanied by a warning tone or look.
In the next section, we consider the cognitive background against 
which communication takes place, reviewing several distinctions 
among types of mental state that are relevant to our discussion. In the 
following two sections, we introduce a theoretical notion, manifestness, 
which helps to clarify the relations among these various types of men-
tal state. Finally, we will use the notion of manifestness to characterise 
ostensive communication, and apply the resulting framework to some 
of the examples discussed in sections 2 and 3.
To keep the discussion brief, we will consider only declarative (as 
opposed to directive) acts, for instance, saying “It’s fi ve o’clock”, or 
pointing to a clock showing the time as fi ve o’clock. In Relevance and 
elsewhere, we have suggested how to extend the analysis to other kinds 
of illocutionary act (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, chap. 4, section 7; 
Wilson and Sperber 1988/2012).
3. Types of mental state: beliefs and impressions
In his earliest work on meaning, Grice assumed that declarative acts 
were intended to induce a belief in the audience (e.g. the addressee of 
the utterance “It’s fi ve o’clock” would be intended to form the belief that 
it was fi ve o’clock). As he later recognised, however, reminders and re-
capitulations present problems for this approach (Grice 1989: 106–7):
Reminding:  Q: “Let me see, what was that girl’s name?”
 A: “Rose” (or produces a rose).
The questioner is here already presumed to believe that the girl’s name is Rose 
(at least in a dispositional sense); it has just slipped his mind. The intended 
effect seems to be that A should have it in mind that her name is Rose.
Review of facts: Both speaker and hearer are supposed already to believe 
that p (q, and so forth). The intended effect again seems 
to be that A (and perhaps U also) should have “the facts” 
in mind (altogether).
In response, Grice (1989: 109) suggested that declarative acts might 
be intended to induce not just a belief but an ‘activated belief’ (in his 
terms, a belief that the addressee not only has, but “has in mind”). An 
addressee might fall short of having an activated belief in one of three 
ways. He might:
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 (1) neither believe that p nor have it in mind that p
 (2) believe that p but not have it in mind that p
 (3) not believe that p but have it in mind that p
Ordinary assertions, reminders and recapitulations could then be seen 
as addressing different types of shortfall, inducing activated beliefs by 
different routes.
Grice’s suggestion raises a more general question about distinctions 
among types of belief (roughly captured by contrasts such as ‘activated/
latent’, ‘occurrent/dispositional’, ‘explicit/implicit’), and the extent to 
which declarative acts are intended to induce some specifi c type of be-
lief in the audience. We will argue that the typologies of belief-states 
common in philosophical psychology may not be adequate to answer 
this question.
3.1 Occurrent, dispositional and implicit beliefs
Beliefs are commonly seen as playing a central causal role in the ex-
planation of thought and behaviour. In the kind of accounts we are 
concerned with here, a belief is a representation that has to be occur-
rent or activated in the mind in order to play such a causal role. Occur-
rent or activated beliefs contrast with inactive or dispositional beliefs, 
which are also understood as being ‘in the mind’ (in a different sense 
from Grice’s), although not immediately available for use as premises 
in theoretical or practical inferences.
A somewhat psychologically richer way of describing this distinction 
might be to say that activated beliefs are in working memory, whereas 
latent beliefs are in long-term memory and have to be retrieved in or-
der to play a causal role. Or, to borrow a metaphor from Robert Audi 
(1994: 420),
What is dispositionally as opposed to occurrently believed is analogous to 
what is in a computer’s memory but not on its screen: the former need only 
be brought to the screen by scrolling—a simple retrieval process—in order 
to be used, whereas the latter is before one’s eyes. Compare a dispositionally 
believed proposition’s needing to be “called in,” as in answering a request to 
be reminded of what one said last week, with an occurrently believed propo-
sition’s being focally in mind, roughly in the sense that one attends to it, as 
where one has just formulated it to offer as one’s thesis.
Activated and latent (or occurrent and dispositional) beliefs are seen 
as representations ‘in the mind’. Both are also described as ‘explicit’, 
and contrast with contents that an agent may be said to believe even 
though they are not represented in her mind; these are sometimes 
called ‘implicit’, or ‘tacit’, beliefs.
Here is how Eric Schwitzgebel (2006) presents the distinction be-
tween explicit and implicit beliefs in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy:
One believes P explicitly if a representation with that content is actually 
present in the mind in the right sort of way—for example, if a sentence with 
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that content is inscribed in the “belief box”... One believes P implicitly (or 
tacitly) if one believes P, but the mind does not possess, in a belief-like way, 
a representation with that content.3
This raises the question of how to distinguish implicit beliefs from con-
tents that are not themselves believed, although they follow logically 
from one’s beliefs. Schwitzgebel suggests that there may be no clear 
cut-off point between the two:
Perhaps all that’s required to implicitly believe something is that the rel-
evant content be swiftly derivable from something one explicitly believes … 
Thus, in the planets case, we may say that you believe explicitly that the 
number of planets is 9 and only implicitly that the number of planets is less 
than 10, less than 11, etc. Of course, if swift derivability is the criterion, 
then although there may be a sharp line between explicit and implicit be-
liefs (depending on whether the representation is stored or not), there will 
not be a sharp line between what one believes implicitly and what, though 
derivable from one’s beliefs, one does not actually believe, since swiftness is 
a matter of degree.
In keeping with this suggestion, Robert Audi (1994: 419) argues that 
what are generally called implicit beliefs are better viewed not as be-
liefs at all, but as dispositions to believe:
Do you believe that this sentence has more than two words? And do you 
believe that 98.124 is larger than 98? It would be natural to answer affi rma-
tively. And surely, for most readers considering these questions, that would 
be answering truly. […] Antecedent belief may be the readiest explanation 
of our spontaneous answers, but it is not the best explanation. I contend 
that, here, what may seem to be antecedently held but as yet unarticulated 
dispositional beliefs are really something quite different: dispositions to be-
lieve.
Integrating these ‘dispositions to believe’ into his computer screen met-
aphor, Audi writes:
By contrast with both of these cases of actual belief [i.e., occurrent and dis-
positional beliefs], propositions we are only disposed to believe are more like 
those a computer would display only upon doing a calculation, say addition: 
the raw materials, which often include inferential principles, are present, 
but the proposition is not yet in the memory bank or on the screen. The sug-
gested difference between a dispositional belief and a disposition to believe 
is in part that between accessibility of a proposition by a retrieval process 
that draws on memory and its accessibility only through a belief formation 
process.
As a result of these considerations, one might divide beliefs into three 
categories, as in Figure 2:
3 Schwitzgebel notes that some philosophers use the term ‘dispositional’ for what 
he is calling implicit beliefs. However, he reserves the term for latent (as opposed to 
occurrent) beliefs, and we will follow him on this.
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Beliefs
Mentally represented Not mentally represented
(‘implicit’, or ‘tacit’, or not 







(in long-term memory) 
Figure 2
The problem with this proposal is that what actually exists, at least 
in the case of dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, are not 
distinct categories but a continuum of cases, Arguably, we do actually 
have activated representations in working memory. However, there is 
a long-standing consensus in the psychology of memory that what we 
have in long-term memory is not a repertoire of representations that 
we can simply move to working memory (or scroll down to), but traces 
or bits of information from which actual representations are recon-
structed for use in working memory. This is not to deny that there are 
also likely to be some full-fl edged representations which can simply be 
activated (as when you remember the Pythagoras theorem you learned 
by heart at school). But when you remember facts about the last de-
partmental meeting—say, that John spoke after Jean, and that she 
seemed irritated—you are not simply moving these representations 
from long-term to short-term memory: the chances are that they were 
not stored there as distinct representations in the fi rst place. What you 
have in long-term memory is information from which these representa-
tions can be accurately constructed—as opposed to just being pulled 
out. With some pieces of memorized information, retrieval—a mislead-
ing term—involves more inferential reconstruction than with others. 
But the point is that, since retrieval from long-term memory typically 
involves some inference, it is not possible to distinguish implicit beliefs 
from latent/dispositional beliefs on the ground that one is derived via 
inference and the other is not.
Here is a continuum between dispositional and implicit beliefs in 
the spirit of Audi’s argument that we merely have a disposition to be-
lieve that 98.124 is larger than 98. If the only requirement for a belief 
of yours to be dispositional is that you have memorized this informa-
tion at some point in the past and are now remembering it, then your 
belief that 9 is larger than 8 is surely dispositional: the sequence of 
numbers from 0 to some small number is permanently represented in 
your mind.4 Your belief that 99 is larger than 98 might also be disposi-
4 This is not the same as having the relation between any two successive numbers 
in that sequence itself stored as a distinct representation, but we will ignore this for 
the time being.
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tional, since you have probably also entertained it (in some form), for 
instance when counting to 100. What about your belief that 7899 is 
larger than 7898? Well… For some n, your belief that n is larger than 
n–1 has been previously represented in your mind, whereas your belief 
that n+1 is larger than n has not (and of course you don’t know the 
value of n). However, there is no interesting epistemic or psychologi-
cal difference between beliefs about successive numbers lower than n 
and beliefs about successive numbers higher than n. Moreover, reac-
tion time studies show that such beliefs are constructed on the basis of 
a mental number line, in a way that goes quite against the idea that 
previously held beliefs are merely reactivated (Dehaene 1997). These 
studies provide evidence that, for any two numbers m and n, it takes 
more time to answer the question, “Is m larger than n?” when n and m 
are closer than when they are further apart. Thus, it takes more time 
to answer ‘Yes’ to the question “Is 29 larger than 28?” than to the ques-
tion “Is 69 larger than 28?” Yet when n and m are close, and even more 
so when they are adjacent, it is much more likely that the proposition 
m is larger than n has already been entertained than when n and m are 
distant. So if activating a belief was a matter of retrieving past repre-
sentations, the answer should be faster for adjacent numbers.
With numerical examples of this type, the propositions we are dis-
posed to believe follow logically from what we explicitly believe. But we 
are also disposed to believe propositions that follow non-demonstra-
tively from our mentally represented beliefs. So, for instance, we im-
plicitly believe (or are disposed to believe, and in any case would assent 
to the claim) that the weather in New York will be warmer next July 
than next January, that more people were born in 1992 than in 1932, 
that Helsinki is east of Naples, and so on.
How readily we assent to some statement that does not express an 
activated belief of ours depends on two factors, one epistemic, and the 
other cognitive. On the epistemic side, we don’t simply believe or not be-
lieve a proposition: we believe it more or less strongly. The less strongly 
we believe it, the less willing we may be to assent to it when expressed, 
and the less appropriate it is to describe our attitude to it as one of 
belief. The point being that here, too, there is a continuum, between 
propositions we believe and propositions we neither believe nor disbe-
lieve, with no cut-off point or even a bimodal distribution of instances. 
On the cognitive-processing side, a given dispositional or implicit belief 
of ours may be more or less salient, more or less easy to reconstruct 
or infer. The salience of a belief is not just a function of its epistemic 
strength: some logical entailments of what we strongly believe may 
not be salient at all, whereas a merely probable implication of what 
we weakly believe may be highly salient. For instance, when someone 
tells us that her sister Jane is in town, the implication that Jane or the 
Pope is in town is unlikely to become very salient, although it follows 
logically from what we have been told (and may quite strongly believe). 
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By contrast, when someone tells us that a neighbour of theirs may have 
Alzheimer’s, the probable implication that the neighbour is old is likely 
to be quite salient, although our evidence for this is not conclusive. So 
dispositional and implicit beliefs are on a continuum with propositions 
we do not believe in any sense (activated, dispositional or implicit), 
either because they are too hard for us to infer, or because we are not 
disposed to give them enough credence.
There are also propositions that we are disposed to believe although 
they don’t follow either logically or non-demonstratively from what we 
already believe, but follow instead from what we already believe to-
gether with what we perceive. Consider Audi’s example: “Do you be-
lieve that this sentence has more than two words?” It is conceivable 
(just) that on reading this sentence, you formed the mentally-repre-
sented belief that you were reading the sentence, ‘Do you believe that 
this sentence has more than two words?’ and are able to infer from 
that belief, together with your ability to inspect it in memory, that the 
sentence has more than two words. What about, “Do you believe that 
there are more than 50 words in this paragraph?” You will probably 
answer ‘Yes’, but the way you arrive at this answer will be by looking at 
the paragraph rather than consulting your memory. Here again, there 
is a continuum of cases between those where you have a disposition 
to believe immediately, and those where, in order to answer the ques-
tion, you have to attend perceptually to more than you were attending 
to already. In these latter cases, the disposition to believe is not (so to 
speak) wholly inside you, but also involves the environment. However, 
the fact that the environment is involved does not stop it being a dispo-
sition. This environment-dependent disposition to believe may in fact 
be stronger than a purely internal disposition to believe.
With all this in mind, let’s return to Grice’s suggestion that a declar-
ative act might be intended to induce not just a belief but an ‘activated 
belief’. In the case of reminders, this suggestion seems quite plausible; 
but how far does it generalise? Consider the following dialogue:
(John is offering drinks to his guests; some have already taken whis-
ky, vodka, cognac or orange juice)
John (to Rita): Do you want some whisky?
Rita: I don’t drink alcohol.
Rita is explicitly communicating that she doesn’t drink alcohol and im-
plicitly communicating several further propositions:
 (a) She doesn’t want whisky
 (b) Her reason for refusing his offer of whisky is that she doesn’t 
    drink alcohol
 (c) She doesn’t want cognac
 (d) She doesn’t want vodka
  (e) She might accept orange juice
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But does Rita intend John to entertain all these implicatures as acti-
vated beliefs? Certainly, she intends him to form the activated belief 
that she doesn’t want whisky (implicature (a)). Of the other implica-
tures, though, she would typically intend him to activate only those 
that may turn out to be relevant to his actions. Suppose that, instead of 
forming the activated belief that her reason for refusing his offer is that 
she doesn’t drink alcohol (implicature (b)), he merely holds it disposi-
tionally, to await activation should the need arise. Even so, it would be 
quite wrong to say that communication has failed: a belief can be com-
municated without being activated in the addressee. In appropriate 
circumstances—for instance, if it crosses his mind to offer her vodka 
instead of whisky—he may form the activated belief that she doesn’t 
want vodka (implicature (d)); otherwise, the fact that he is disposed to 
form this belief as a result of her utterance should be enough for com-
munication to succeed.
This description of the different kinds of credal disposition an utter-
ance may cause in an audience is sensitive to distinctions Grice does not 
envisage; however, it is still not fi ne-grained enough. In many cases of 
verbal or non-verbal communication, what the communicator wants to 
do is not to induce a specifi c belief or set of beliefs in the audience, but 
to cause what might be roughly described as an impression, giving rise 
to a range of non-paraphrasable effects. Grice’s suggestion that what is 
conveyed in this type of case might be analysed as an “open disjunction” 
of propositions is not really helpful; we will try to improve on it here.
3.2 Impressions
What is an impression? In section 2, we used the example of Mary, 
newly arrived on holiday, sniffi ng appreciatively and ostensively at the 
fresh seaside air in order to share an impression with Peter. Here are 
two more examples:
Robert, working at his desk, is wondering whether to take a break and go 
for a walk. He gets up, opens the window: the sky is grey; the air is chilly; 
clouds, some of them rather dark, are moving fast. The impression he forms 
of the conditions outside make him change his mind. He will stay at home. 
John has told Julia—who believed him—that the artist is a pretentious and 
rather conventional painter. However, he has to go to the exhibition, and 
he begs her to come too. As she walks through the gallery, she is pleasantly 
surprised by several of the paintings. Although she couldn’t have pinpointed 
what she likes about them, she fi nds them arresting and somehow insight-
ful. The impression she forms makes her change her mind. What John has 
told her is false. The painter, she comes to believe, is original and talented.
As these examples show, the formation of an impression, just like the 
formation of a belief, can bring about a theoretical or practical change 
of mind.
Bringing about a change of mind in one’s audience is a typical goal 
of communication: indeed, with a suitably extended understanding of 
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‘change of mind’, it is the goal of any act of communication. The goals 
of communication, then, can sometimes be achieved by conveying an 
impression. For instance, Robert says to Susan, “Let’s go for a walk.” 
She might answer by opening the window and showing him the poor 
weather outside. She would thereby be causing him to form an impres-
sion about the weather, and doing so ostensively (i.e. in such a way as 
to let him know that she is trying to communicate with him). Robert 
could then infer from his impression that it is not a good idea to go for a 
walk, and moreover that she intended him to form that impression and 
come to that conclusion, both of which they now share. Or as they walk 
through the exhibition, Julia might say to John: “I don’t know how to 
put it… not what I expected… these paintings have something…, I’m 
sure you too must…Thanks for making me come!” As a result of her 
utterance, John might form an impression of Julia’s impression, which 
in turn might help him share it, or at least revise his fi rst impression 
in the direction of hers. In many circumstances, this might be quite 
enough for Julia’s communication to succeed.
But what exactly is an impression? Does this common-sense notion 
pick out some mental state that we should be able to describe in cogni-
tive terms, or is it irrelevant to scientifi c psychology? In any case, what 
is the process commonly described as forming an impression, and how 
does it achieve its cognitive impact? How can an impression be what 
a communicator wants to convey? How is it triggered and exploited in 
communication?
4. Manifestness
What occurrent, dispositional and implicit ‘beliefs’ have in common is 
that there is some proposition that you are likely to some positive degree 
to entertain and accept as true. Following our proposal in Relevance, we 
will say that this proposition is manifest to you. Manifestness depends 
on two factors mentioned in section 3.1 above: strength of belief and sa-
lience.5 These factors are quite different—one is epistemic and the other 
cognitive—and for some purposes it would be unsound to lump them to-
gether. However, we need to consider their joint effect in order to explain 
or predict the causal role of a piece of information in the mental process-
es of an individual. The greater the degree of manifestness (i.e. the resul-
tant or vector sum of these two factors, epistemic strength and salience) 
of some piece of information to an individual, the greater the causal role 
of that information in the individual’s thought and behaviour.
Here, then, is a defi nition of manifestness that differs marginally 
in formulation, though not in import, from the one given in Relevance 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 38–41), followed by some clarifi catory 
comments:
5 In Relevance, we used the term ‘accessibility’ rather than ‘salience’ to refer to 
the same property.
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Manifestness
A proposition is manifest to an individual at a given time to the extent 
that he is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as 
true.
Comments:
● In Relevance, we talked not of propositions but of assumptions as 
being manifest. Either term will do, and so would ‘pieces of infor-
mation’. What we are talking about are things that can be true or 
false and that, when they are true, are facts.
● The time referred to is a not a time point but a time span within 
which an inferential process may take place. Since such processes 
can be more or less extended in time, the time span may vary from 
a fraction of a second to a much longer period in which a protracted 
inference process such as a scientifi c discovery takes place. What 
makes a proposition manifest in such a time span is not only the 
mind-brain state of the individual during that time, but also the 
environment of the individual and the information it provides 
him with via perception and communication. Of course, if we are 
talking about what is manifest to Robert at the moment he opens 
the windows, or what is manifest to Julia as she walks through 
the exhibition, or what was manifest to Eratosthenes while he 
was calculating the circumference of the earth, the situations are 
quite different. Depending on the time span, what is manifest to 
the individual may involve information provided by the environ-
ment, or communicated by others, to a lesser or greater degree. 
Another way of putting this is that the mental processes involved 
may be more or less extended not only in time, but also in physi-
cal and social space, and include processes characteristic of what 
is described in the literature as embodied, situated, or distributed 
cognition. We see this not as a problem with our defi nition but as 
an advantage. Here, though, we will be concerned with the kind of 
short time span and organism–environment interactions involved 
in understanding an utterance.
● In Relevance, we described the two factors that contribute to the 
manifestness of a proposition: its salience (‘accessibility’) and the 
degree to which it is accepted as true. These two factors affect the 
probability that a proposition will infl uence an individual’s beliefs 
or decisions: the higher the probability that it will be accessed, the 
higher, ceteris paribus, the probability that it will have some infl u-
ence, and the higher the degree to which it is accepted as true, the 
stronger that infl uence. However, manifestness is this ceteris pari-
bus probability of infl uence, rather than the factors that contribute 
to it. The same point can be made on the basis of the Cognitive 
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Principle of Relevance (‘Human cognition tends to be geared to the 
maximisation of relevance’): Given a belief which has a cognitive 
effect and which is therefore relevant in a categorical sense, its rel-
evance will be comparatively greater 1) to the extent that its pro-
cessing is less costly because it is more salient, and 2) to the extent 
that its epistemic strength is greater. If a proposition is relevant at 
all, then the greater its manifestness, the greater its relevance.
In Relevance, based on this notion of manifestness, we introduced sev-
eral further notions:
A cognitive environment of an individual at a time is a set of 
assumptions/propositions that are manifest to that individual at that 
time. A cognitive environment can be shared between two or more in-
dividuals if it is a cognitive environment of each of them. Among the 
propositions manifest in a shared cognitive environment, some may 
enumerate or identify the people who share that environment. In that 
case, this shared environment is also a mutual cognitive environ-
ment, and all the propositions in it are mutually manifest. In Rele-
vance, we spend some time showing that the notion of mutual mani-
festness is more realistic, more psychologically relevant, and at least 
as cogent as the notions of mutual knowledge, common knowledge or 
common ground (Lewis 1969; Clark and Marshall 1981; Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/1995: chapter 1, sections 3, 8; 1990; Stalnaker 2002) used 
in particular to explicate the Grice–Strawson insight that communica-
tive intentions are ‘overt’. We will not discuss these uses of the notion 
of manifestness here.
We also used the notion of manifestness to redefi ne the content of 
communicative intentions so as to provide an explicit and unitary ac-
count of cases involving the communication of single propositions, on 
the one hand, and of what Grice describes as “open disjunctions”, on 
the other. This is the use of ‘manifestness’ that we will now elaborate 
and discuss.
We will begin our account in the next section by reassessing the 
types of mental state discussed in section 3 in the light of this char-
acterisation of manifestness. We will argue, fi rst, that the rather ar-
tifi cial categories of occurrent/dispositional/implicit beliefs are on a 
continuum of degrees of manifestness, and second, that we can give a 
better account of what it is to have an impression using the notion of 
manifestness.
5. Manifestness, beliefs and impressions
5.1 Beliefs and manifestness
Occurrent beliefs are not all equally manifest. In the fi rst place, they 
are not all equally salient. Suppose you are asked to recommend your 
two favourite restaurants. You activate a number of beliefs about each, 
but some of them stand out more than others: for instance, your belief 
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that the desserts at Pierre’s are exceptional may be the most salient 
of all your beliefs about either restaurant, whereas your belief that it 
is hard to park at La Cantina, although activated, may not be much 
attended. In the second place, occurrent beliefs may be epistemically 
stronger or weaker: you might think of both restaurants as having 
an excellent wine list, but be more convinced of this in the case of La 
Cantina than of Pierre’s. Ceteris paribus, the activated beliefs that are 
more salient, and those that are more fi rmly held, are more likely to 
inform your conclusions.
At a given moment, there may be a genuine functional difference 
between occurrent beliefs in working memory and dispositional beliefs 
in long-term memory. However, since the contents of working memory 
are constantly changing, with some elements being added and oth-
ers dropping out, a belief that is about to be recovered from long term 
memory may well play a greater role in a given inference than a belief 
that is still in working memory (though not for long) because of the role 
it played in a preceding inference. If we look at the mental status of 
beliefs dynamically (as we should), it should be clear that an occurrent 
belief is not necessarily more manifest than a dispositional one. Dis-
positional beliefs of course vary along the dimensions of salience and 
strength, and hence of manifestness. Some of our dispositional beliefs 
may well be less manifest—indeed, much less manifest—than implicit 
beliefs we have never entertained before but for which there is strong 
and salient evidence, either in memory or in the environment. For in-
stance, you may be able to answer the question, “Would the children 
prefer Pierre’s or La Cantina?” immediately and with confi dence, even 
though you had never previously entertained the answer you now give; 
by contrast, it may take you some time to answer the question, “What 
is the name of the chef at La Cantina?” and your answer may not be 
entirely confi dent, even though you have heard the name before (hum, 
I remember commenting that it was not an Italian name but a Hungar-
ian one, a famous name actually, Kadar? Molnar? Lukács? Yes, Lukács, 
like the philosopher, I think).
To sum up, the division of beliefs or potential beliefs into three cat-
egories is too coarse. A gradient in terms of manifestness is more help-
ful.
5.2 Impressions and manifestness
Using the notion of manifestness, we can also give a more precise ac-
count of impressions. When Robert, intending to go for a walk, opens 
the windows to see what the weather is like and alters his plans, what 
happens to, and in, his mind? We might be tempted to say that, on the 
basis of his perceptions, he has formed new beliefs and used them as 
premises in a practical inference. Which new beliefs? Well, maybe the 
belief that the sky is grey and the air is quite cold, that it is therefore 
likely to rain, and that the weather is not right for taking a walk. Many 
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combinations of similar and related beliefs would indeed warrant the 
practical conclusion he has arrived at. Although we cannot know exact-
ly which beliefs Robert formed and used as premises, we might assume 
that only such a determinate set of beliefs could have caused Robert 
to change his mind. It might suit our theoretical agenda to think that 
there are facts of the matter, and that Robert knows them, or may have 
known them, however fl eetingly, at the time.
But we have all been in Robert’s position, and we should envisage 
the possibility that he might have come to his decision without ever 
being aware of clear and distinct premises, or of deriving his decision 
from those premises. Here is an alternative description. When Robert 
opened the window, an array of propositions became manifest or more 
manifest to him, in the sense characterised above: they became more 
likely to be attended to, and more likely to be taken as true, than they 
had been before, and were therefore more likely to infl uence his deci-
sion. He may have been aware of this increase in the manifestness of 
an array of propositions, and of their general drift, without entertain-
ing all of them, and maybe even without entertaining any of them as a 
distinct proposition, except for the practical conclusion that he would 
not go for a walk.
Not all inferences involve step by logical step derivations of explicit 
conclusions from explicit premises. Arguably, the vast majority of in-
ferences made by humans and other animals do not involve such deri-
vations. What happened in Robert’s brain when he opened the window 
might be better described as changes in patterns of activation, none 
of which would properly speaking amount to the fi xation of a distinct 
credal representation, but the totality of which would correspond to the 
formation of an impression. These changes would then jointly inhibit 
what may have been a distinct volitional representation, his desire to 
take a walk. Thus, rather than a step-by-step derivation of an explicit 
conclusion from explicit premises, the inferential process might have 
consisted in John’s impression of the weather undermining his desire 
to go for a walk. More generally, many (if not all) inferences can be 
described not as more or less standard logical derivations but as com-
petitions between alternative conclusions (it will rain/it won’t rain, let’s 
go for a walk/let’s not, and so on). The winner of such competitions 
is determined by activation or inhibition caused by brain states that 
represent information in all kind of ways (from consciously entertained 
propositions to unconscious weightings of features—where ‘represent’ 
is broadly understood as meaning fulfi l the function of making some 
information available for processing). If the mental mechanisms which 
decide the outcome of such competitions tend to favour warranted con-
clusions, then although the process is quite different from a sequence 
of good old syllogisms, it would still be genuinely inferential. We are 
not arguing for this view of human inference here, but merely arguing 
against tying our understanding of the role of inference in communica-
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tion to an old, narrow and questionable view of what such inference 
must be like.
We are suggesting, then, that an impression is a change in the man-
ifestness of an array of propositions which all bear on our understand-
ing the same phenomenon, answering the same question, or deciding 
on the same issue. This is not intended as an analysis of the ordinary 
use of the word ‘impression’. If someone told us that this account of 
impressions does not capture the ordinary usage of the term, we would 
say that we are proposing to use ‘impression’ as a technical term, to 
denote a psychologically relevant category, whether or not this cate-
gory is recognised as such in common-sense or philosophical psychol-
ogy. In fact, though, we believe our technical use corresponds fairly 
closely to—and, if anything, sharpens—the typically vague common-
sense meaning of ‘impression.’ It may be worth briefl y showing this by 
considering a possible objection. ‘To have the impression that’ can be 
construed as expressing a propositional attitude that takes a propo-
sition as its complement. For instance, Robert might say “I had the 
impression that it would rain”. Does this use of ‘impression’ differ in 
meaning from the one we were trying to capture above? One might be 
tempted to say that ‘to have the impression that’ denotes a weak credal 
state, not quite a belief that P, but a belief that probably P. However, 
this is demonstrably wrong. Suppose you enter a classroom and say, “I 
have the impression that there are more than fi fty and fewer than a 
hundred people in this room”. This is an appropriate use of the phrase, 
and corresponds to a situation where you have formed an impression 
in the sense we described earlier, from which a conclusion follows. That 
is, an array of propositions have become manifest to you, and although 
you are not aware of them individually, this overall change in your 
cognitive environment warrants the inference that there are probably 
more than fi fty and fewer than a hundred people in the room. Now sup-
pose you were to say instead, “I have the impression that the number of 
people in the room is not a multiple of 11,” drawing on your knowledge 
of the fact that the chance of a random integer being a multiple of 11 
is one in eleven. In this case, your use of the phrase would not be ap-
propriate, even though you would be expressing the attitude of taking 
the proposition embedded in your utterance to be probably true. Thus, 
‘impression’ does not simply pick out a weak credal attitude; it picks 
out a certain type of vague information basis for such an attitude.
We now have all we need to address Grice’s worries about the kind 
of effects a declarative act is intended to induce in the audience, and 
to provide a framework in which the full range of possible effects—
including prototypical cases of speaker’s meaning—can be treated in a 
conceptually unifi ed way.
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6. Manifestness and communicative intentions
In Relevance, we began by proposing an informal and incomplete defi -
nition of the two intentions involved in ostensive communication (cor-
responding to the fi rst two clauses of Grice’s defi nition of meaning) 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 29):
Informative intention: to inform the audience of something;
Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative intention.
Using the notion of manifestness, we then gave a more precise and 
fuller version which we reformulate slightly here (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995: chapter 1, section 10):
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience 
an array of propositions I.
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to audience and 
communicator that the communicator has this informative intention.
We won’t discuss here the role of mutual manifestness in the commu-
nicative intention. Instead, we want to highlight and develop the claim 
that in all cases of communication, wherever they fall on the mean-
ing/showing continuum or the determinate/indeterminate continuum, 
the intended import is achieved in the same way: by making mutually 
manifest one’s intention to make an array of propositions manifest or 
more manifest to the audience.
Consider the version of Robert’s story where he says to Susan, “Let’s 
go for a walk” and she responds by opening the window and showing 
him the poor weather outside. By responding in this way, she makes 
manifest to him her intention to make manifest or more manifest an 
array of propositions which are relevant to his proposal to go for a walk, 
and which have become perceptually salient as a result of her opening 
the window. Of course, these are not the only propositions that her 
behaviour has made more manifest: it has become more manifest, for 
instance, that the window can be easily opened, that the street is noisy, 
and that she doesn’t want to go for a walk because of the bad weather. 
However, out of all these propositions that her behaviour has made 
more manifest, Robert is able to identify the array of propositions that 
she manifestly intended to make more manifest. How? They are the 
propositions whose increase in manifestness makes her communicative 
behaviour relevant in a way she may have intended and expected. 
In another version, Susan responds to Robert’s proposal by saying, 
“The weather is really awful!” By replying in this way, she makes man-
ifest to him her intention to make manifest the proposition that the 
weather is really awful. Her behaviour also makes manifest a variety 
of other propositions: for instance, that she has a sore throat, and that 
she doesn’t want to go for a walk because of the bad weather. Again, 
Robert is able to identify the array of propositions she has intentionally 
made manifest: as before, they are the propositions whose increase in 
manifestness makes her communicative behaviour relevant in a way 
she may have intended and expected. 
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When Susan’s response is verbal, the array of propositions she 
communicates can be partly characterised by enumerating some of 
its members. These include the explicature(s) of her utterance (in this 
case, that the weather is awful) plus any implicatures that she made 
it wholly manifest that she intended to communicate (in this case, that 
she doesn’t want to go for a walk). However, the full array of propo-
sitions communicated by Susan cannot be enumerated by listing (or 
providing a procedure for listing) all its members. Of course, enumerat-
ing all the members of an array is not the only way to identify it. For 
instance, it can also be identifi ed by description. The array of propo-
sitions communicated by Susan contains the explicature and the one 
clear implicature of her utterance, plus all those implications of her ut-
terance that were to some degree manifest to her and that she expected 
and intended her utterance to make more manifest to Robert in a way 
that would make her utterance optimally relevant.
When Susan responds non-verbally, by opening the window, the ar-
ray of propositions she communicates can be characterised purely by a 
description: she intends to make more manifest to him those proposi-
tions which have become more manifest both to her and to Robert—i.e. 
which have become part of their mutual cognitive environment—as a 
result of her opening the window, and which are relevant because they 
imply an answer to Robert’s proposal; the gist of this answer being that 
she doesn’t want to go for a walk because of the bad weather.
Enumeration and description are not the only two ways in which an 
addressee may identify the array of propositions that a communicator 
manifestly intended to make (more) manifest to him. For instance, as a 
result of the communicator’s behaviour, the addressee may experience 
a certain change in his cognitive environment, and identify this change, 
or part of it, as something the communicator intended to cause in him 
and to have him recognise as what she intended to communicate. In 
this case, what is needed to identify the array is neither enumeration 
nor description, but merely metacognitive acquaintance.
Note that in talking of metacognitive acquaintance, we are not 
bringing onto the scene a new and unheard of kind of psychological 
awareness of the effects of other minds on our own. On the contrary, 
our awareness of the psychological effects that others have on us is a 
quite unremarkable aspect of our interactions with one another. We 
know it when our understanding of what others have in mind pleases 
us, angers us, shames us, makes us feel proud, and—less emotionally—
makes us see things in a new light, makes us like or dislike things, 
makes us rethink the past and anticipate the future differently. We are 
often aware of the fact that a change of mind (whether or not we could 
spell out its exact content) was brought about by what we understood 
of the minds of others. What people do when they communicate is pre-
cisely to overtly reveal something of their own mind in order to bring 
about such changes of mind in their audience.
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A central claim of Relevance and later elaborations of the theory is 
that, because of the Communicative Principle of Relevance, the address-
ee can intuitively identify the array of propositions communicated by 
an act of ostensive communication by following a task-specifi c ‘modular’ 
inferential procedure (Sperber and Wilson 2002). The same procedure 
applies whether the act is one of ‘meaning that’ or of ‘showing that’, and 
whether the intended import is determinate or indeterminate.
There are two specifi c propositions that any communicator, using 
any form of ostensive communication, makes it mutually manifest that 
she intends to make manifest: these serve as premises for the interpre-
tation of her communicative act, rather than being part of that interpre-
tation. The fi rst proposition describes the particulars of the communi-
cative behaviour of the communicator: for instance, that Susan opened 
the window in response to Robert’s proposal, or that Susan said “The 
weather is really awful!” in response to Robert’s proposal. Any theory 
of comprehension assumes that some such information is represented 
in the comprehender’s mind. Relevance theory claims that for any act 
of ostensive communication, there is a second immediately identifi able 
proposition that the communicator makes it mutually manifest that 
she intends to make manifest: the presumption that this act of com-
munication is optimally relevant to the addressee (in a precise sense of 
‘optimal’ defi ned in Relevance: 266–71).
Interpreting an utterance involves using these two propositions as 
premises (together with contextual information) in order to identify the 
array I. It is this identifi cation that constitutes the interpretation of 
the communicative act. A central claim of relevance theory is that this 
array is identifi ed by following a path of least effort, and stopping when 
the resulting interpretation is such that the communicator could have 
expected it to satisfy the presumption of relevance automatically con-
veyed by that communicative act. On this approach, the intended im-
port of a communicative act is not inferred on the basis of general max-
ims or principles, but on the basis of a presumption of the relevance of 
that specifi c act, which is communicated by the act itself without being 
part of its interpretation.
The addressee can identify the array I of propositions that an act of 
ostensive communication makes manifest in a variety of ways. We will 
consider cases of verbal communication in the next section. Here are 
some examples of non-verbal communication.
Peter asks Mary: “Did you bring your cell phone?” She answers by 
showing him her cell phone. Here, the array of propositions she makes 
it mutually manifest that she intends to make manifest to Peter may 
be a singleton: the proposition that she did bring her cell phone.
If Peter had said, “I’m sure you forgot to bring your cell phone,” 
Mary’s act of showing him her cell phone would have made manifest 
an array containing, on the one hand, two distinct propositions—that 
she did bring her cell phone and that Peter was wrong to be sure she 
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had forgotten to bring it—and on the other hand a vague sub-array of 
propositions whose increase in manifestness would amount to shaming 
Peter for his lack of trust in Mary.
In a case of non-verbal communication with indeterminate import, 
as when Mary sniffs appreciatively and ostensively at the seaside air, 
the whole array I is vaguely identifi ed as that array of propositions 
which makes (or is expected to make) the communicator’s behaviour 
optimally relevant to Peter. Suppose, for instance, that Peter was al-
ready appreciating the seaside air on his own: then her act may achieve 
relevance just by making mutually manifest that what is becoming 
manifest to each of them is mutually manifest.
7. What, if anything, remains of speaker’s meaning?
One of our aims in this paper was to show that building an adequate 
theory of communication involves going beyond Grice’s notion of speak-
er’s meaning. Another was to provide a conceptually unifi ed explana-
tion of how a wider variety of declarative acts than Grice was concerned 
with—including both cases of ‘showing that’ and ‘telling that’—are 
understood. We will end by considering where the resulting account 
leaves the notion of speaker’s meaning we began with, and what light, 
if any, it sheds on the rather fuzzy intuitions that Grice’s defi nition was 
designed to capture. In this last section, we focus on linguistic cases.
One intuitive distinction that Grice originally wanted his defi nition 
of speaker’s meaning to capture was between ‘deliberately and openly 
letting someone know’ (by displaying direct evidence for the intended 
conclusion) and ‘telling’ (where all the evidence would be indirect). As 
discussed in section 2, the existence of a continuum of mixed cases in-
volving both direct and indirect evidence (in different proportions and 
combinations) presents problems for this approach. In cases of ‘showing 
that’, either the evidence for the intended conclusion is not only direct 
but conclusive, or else some of the evidence (or at least some strength-
ening of the evidence) has to come from the communicator’s intentions, 
and this cannot but lead to over-attributions of ‘meaning’ as defi ned by 
Grice. On the other hand, under-attribution of ‘meaning’ should occur 
with cases of ‘telling that’ where no evidence from the communicator’s 
intentions is needed in order to accept the message, either because the 
logical structure of the utterance makes it self-confi rming (as in Grice’s 
example of a logical argument), or because the utterance refers to an 
object or event that provides conclusive evidence for the truth of the 
message (as in the utterance, “To open a champagne bottle, you can 
do this” where “this” refers to a demonstration of how to open a cham-
pagne bottle).
For philosophers of language and linguists who only want to use 
Gricean notions to discuss linguistic cases, one rather convenient, 
though un-Gricean, way to go to is to forget about the third clause of 
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his defi nition of utterer’s meaning, forget about his extended sense of 
‘utterance’, and forget about his concern with providing a principled 
distinction between cases of meaningNN and cases of mere showing. 
Linguistic pragmatics is based on the distinction between what is 
linguistically encoded and what is verbally communicated. Grice illu-
minated our understanding of what is verbally communicated, i.e. of 
‘speaker’s meaning’ in the ordinary sense; so let’s forget his attempt at 
a more ambitious theoretical defi nition, treat the fi rst two clauses of his 
defi nition as necessary conditions characteristic of speaker’s meaning, 
and make it a tacit rule only to study cases of verbal communication 
(or gestures like nodding that stand for verbal behaviour) for which 
this two-clause defi nition of speaker’s meaning seems to pick out the 
intended phenomena.
We have given two reasons not to go that way. The fi rst is that Grice 
was right to characterise, in a novel and ground-breaking way, a type of 
communicative behaviour—what we have called ostensive-inferential 
communication—that encompasses, but is not restricted to, verbal com-
munication. The fi rst two clauses of his defi nition of speaker’s meaning 
(or better, the informative and communicative intentions proposed in 
relevance theory and inspired by Grice) do identify a fundamental form 
of human interaction, in the context of which, inter alia, verbal com-
munication can be better understood and studied. The second reason is 
that one and the same conceptual twist—starting from the assumption 
that the aim in all cases of human ostensive-inferential communication 
is to make an array of propositions (more) manifest —makes it pos-
sible to handle both the meaning/showing continuum and the determi-
nate/indeterminate continuum in a unifi ed way. Focusing solely on the 
study of verbal communication does not resolve the problem that this 
second continuum raises for the Gricean approach.
In verbal communication, as in non-verbal communication, we fi nd 
that addressees exploit the full range of methods for identifying the 
array of propositions that the communicator intends to make (more) 
manifest.
In a case of ‘telling that’ with no implicatures, where the informa-
tion the speaker intends to communicate is a single clear, paraphras-
able proposition, the array is a singleton. An example would be the 
railway offi cial’s reply “12:48” to the question, “When is the next train 
to Oxford?” In relevance theory, we defi ne a notion of strength of com-
munication which applies to individual members of a communicated 
array. A proposition is strongly communicated to the extent that it is 
strongly mutually manifest that the communicator intends to make 
this specifi c proposition manifest to the addressee. Any strongly com-
municated proposition falls unproblematically under the description 
‘speaker’s meaning’. Thus, the proposition that the next train to Oxford 
leaves at 12:48 is strongly communicated by the railway offi cial and is 
also a clear case of speaker’s meaning. Whenever the array of proposi-
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tions I is a singleton, its single member is strongly communicated and 
is a prototypical case of speaker’s meaning.
In a case of ‘telling that’ with clearly identifi able explicatures and 
implicatures, the array can be identifi ed by enumerating its members. 
Consider, for instance, the following exchange between new acquain-
tances chatting at a dinner party in London:
Rob: Do you live in London?
Jen: I live in Chelsea
Here, the relevance of Jen’s utterance depends on two clearly identifi -
able propositions: the explicature that she lives in Chelsea, and the 
implicature that she lives in London. These two are strongly commu-
nicated and are good cases of speaker’s meaning. Given that the ex-
change takes place in London, Jen may take the precision of the phrase 
“in Chelsea” to be relevant to Rob and not to carry any further impli-
catures. However, in appropriate circumstances it might carry such 
implicatures, and her tone of voice, looks, and so on (although not indis-
pensable) might help to achieve these further effects. Since Chelsea is 
a distinctly posh neighbourhood, Rob’s social status would be a highly 
relevant contextual factor in interpreting Jen’s utterance. If he were 
of a similar social status, her utterance might make weakly manifest 
that she is willing to share with him more personal information than 
he has requested, that she is not unwilling to see him again, and so on. 
The gist is clear, but no single proposition is strongly communicated or 
could be confi dently described as part of Jen’s meaning. On the other 
hand, if Rob were, say, a poor academic, then Jen’s utterance, depend-
ing on the tone of voice, might weakly implicate that she belongs to a 
different and superior milieu and is not eager to deepen their acquain-
tance, or, especially if her tone of voice is apologetic, that she is aware 
of living in privileged circumstances and wishes he would not hold it 
against her, and so on. In all these cases, if Rob is at all savvy, he will 
correctly understand that something more than an answer to his ques-
tion has been subtly communicated. The array I in this case is identi-
fi ed by its two strongly communicated members plus an awareness of 
some further cognitive effects that Jen was overtly intending to achieve 
by answering in the way she did.
It is all too easy for pragmaticists simply to ignore these weak ef-
fects and implicatures, and concentrate on strong implicatures that fi t 
straightforwardly with the notion of speaker’s meaning. However, as 
we have been arguing and will illustrate again below, there is a con-
tinuum of cases which should signal that the research is not quite on 
the right track.
The problem raised by such effects becomes harder to ignore when it 
affects not only implicatures but also explicatures. As we have argued 
(Sperber and Wilson 1998, 2008; Wilson and Sperber 2002), the content 
of implicatures and explicatures is inferred through a process of mu-
tual adjustment whose goal is to produce an overall interpretation con-
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sistent with the addressee’s expectations of relevance, and where the 
implicatures are warranted by the explicatures. The linguistically en-
coded sense of an utterance serves as a piece of evidence of the intended 
meaning, and provides a point of departure for constructing a contex-
tually appropriate meaning that may be narrower or broader than the 
encoded meaning, or overlap with it, or even be identical with it, this 
latter outcome being neither preferred nor arrived at ‘by default’. 
Recent work in lexical pragmatics confi rms that most encoded con-
cepts are adjusted, or modulated, in the course of the interpretation 
process (Carston 1997; 2002) Sperber and Wilson 1998, 2008; Wilson 
and Carston 2007). Here is an example where the explicature contains 
an ad hoc concept constructed for the purposes of that particular inter-
pretation:
Mark: We can’t afford La Cantina.
Pamela: I’ve got money.
Pamela’s utterance “I’ve got money” would be literally true if she had 
50c in her pocket; but it would not be optimally relevant. In fact, if she 
only had 50c, it would have been more relevant to produce the literally 
false utterance, “I have no money”. What Pamela’s reply communicates 
to Mark is the relevant information that she is both able and willing to 
pay for a meal at La Cantina. This implicature would not be warranted 
by the literal interpretation of her utterance, hence the construction of 
an ad hoc concept, MONEY*, whose presence in the explicature warrants 
the implicature. But what exactly does she communicate explicitly when 
she says “I’ve got money”? The explicature, although not very vague, is 
not that easy to spell out. Pamela is asserting more than simply that 
she has money: if it turned out that she has 50c, Mark could justifi ably 
complain that she had not just misled him but lied to him. Nor does she 
explicitly communicate that she has enough money to go to La Cantina: 
this is a consequence, rather than a rendering, of what she explicitly 
conveys. Basically, what she is referring to is an amount of money such 
that she is willing and able to pay for a meal at La Cantina, an amount 
which cannot be less than what the bill is likely to come to, but which 
may be quite a bit more. Mark might know her well enough to fi gure 
out roughly what amount she means, or he might just defer to her as 
the ‘expert’ (without this being a case of deferential meaning!). But in 
any case, there is no word or expression in English, or in any meta-lan-
guage used by semanticists, which denotes what Pamela has in mind, 
and which she succeeds more or less in communicating. In other words, 
Pamela’s explicit meaning in this case has a certain vagueness both for 
her addressee and for the analyst, and while this does not compromise 
communication between her and Mark in any way, it does compromise 
a standard account of her speaker’s meaning.
Elsewhere, we and others working in the framework have given 
many examples and analyses of ad hoc concepts: some, like “money” in 
the preceding example, involve narrowing the linguistically specifi ed 
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meaning, while others involving broadening it, and others overlap with 
it. Note that we have described the case of “money” as one of narrowing, 
but in most situations, it could be a case of both narrowing and broad-
ening, and hence of overlap. For instance, Pamela could very well say 
“I have money” when she has only a few dollars in her wallet, but also 
a credit card. In all these cases, pinpointing a proposition that would 
constitute the speaker’s meaning is diffi cult or impossible. On the other 
hand, all these cases can be easily described as making more manifest 
an array of propositions any of which would warrant the implicature. 
The speaker is encouraging the hearer to accept any proposition from 
this array as quite probable, while not committing to one of them in 
particular. This is not quite what is understood by ‘speaker’s mean-
ing’, then, but perhaps it might be close enough for some people to be 
tempted to idealise away the complexity and ignore our proposal about 
how to treat it.
These were cases of fairly strong communication. But as we have 
emphasised, there is a continuum between these and cases of very 
weak communication, where any conceivable paraphrase of the speak-
er’s meaning would be quite defective. This happens when both impli-
catures and explicatures are weak, as is typically the case with meta-
phors.
Suppose that in an idle chat among friends, someone tells you, 
“Freddy is a waste of space”. The idea that a person could be a waste 
of space has no clear literal sense, and you will have to construct an 
ad hoc concept WASTE OF SPACE* in the course of the mutual adjustment 
process in order to arrive at an array of implicatures that satisfi es your 
expectations of relevance (which in this case are themselves likely to be 
rather vague and unconstraining). What you will probably end up with 
is a general impression of Freddy, based on the explicature that Freddy 
is a WASTE OF SPACE*, an ad hoc concept derived by adjusting the linguis-
tically encoded meaning in the light of whatever information is avail-
able to you about Freddy, your friend and the relations between them. 
In this example, both the explicature and the implicatures are weak: 
neither is easily paraphrasable, and although your friend has succeed-
ed in communicating with you, you may fi nd it hard to say exactly what 
she meant. On the other hand, the description of what is communicated 
in terms of increasing the manifestness of an array of propositions can 
be developed without idealising anything away. It won’t inject into the 
description the kind of precision and crispness that some would feel 
more comfortable with, but the phenomenon itself lacks both precision 
and crispness.
Or, to conclude with the classic example “Juliet is the sun”, the ex-
plicature (one might say) is Juliet is the SUN* where, SUN* is an ad 
hoc concept whose meaning is (vaguely) specifi ed by mutually adjust-
ing explicatures and implicatures in order to satisfy expectations of 
relevance: the explicature that Juliet is the SUN* must carry an ar-
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ray of implicatures which makes the utterance relevant as expected, 
and the sense of SUN* must be such that the explicature does indeed 
contextually imply these implicatures. These implicatures are weak, 
and cannot be enumerated. Hence, the explicature that warrants these 
implicatures is itself weak. There is no paraphrase in an adequate 
metalanguage—or even in English used as such a metalanguage—
that provides a plausible analysis or rendering of the speaker’s explicit 
meaning. Even adding starred concepts to the metalanguage (as some-
one might suggest) would not allow us to identify a proposition as the 
speaker’s explicit meaning, since what a starred concept does in this 
context is to vaguely indicate a range of possible interpretations that 
are all made more manifest (i.e. more probable and salient) without 
any one of them being THE correct interpretation. Just as Romeo need 
not have intended any one of these propositions to be taken as his exact 
meaning, so the audience need not, indeed should not, aim to attribute 
any exact meaning to him.
So the intended import of “Juliet is the sun”, as of so many creative 
metaphors, is best described as an array that the audience identifi es 
not by enumeration but by metacognitive acquaintance, by attribut-
ing to the communicator’s intention what they mentally experience. 
In general, what is needed for successful communication is that the 
addressee’s mind be changed in the way overtly intended by the com-
municator, i.e. that the addressee be now disposed or more disposed to 
draw the kind of inferences the communicator intended (or at least that 
the addressee should understand the communicator’s intention, even if 
he does not fulfi l it). The communicator need not intend the addressee 
to make this or that specifi c inference; her intentions may concern only 
the general drift of the addressee’s inferences and remain quite vague, 
and so may the addressee’s understanding, without this amounting to 
a failure of comprehension. What is aimed at in such cases of weak 
communication is a degree of cognitive alignment, not a duplication of 
precise contents.
What, then, remains of speaker’s meaning? Cases in one corner 
of the bidimensional continuum we have described; cases that have 
held the attention of linguists and philosophers of language at a time 
when pragmatics was non-existent, underdeveloped or, more recently, 
ignored; cases that we have tried to show do not have the kind of unity 
and autonomy needed to constitute a proper object of theorising. Like 
the proverbial drunkard in the night looking for his glasses under the 
lamppost not because of any strong reason to believe that they were 
there, but because at least he could see there, students of language 
have stayed close to the lampposts of semantics and logic. The drunk-
ard’s strategy need not be irrational. But after a while… especially if 
there are glimmers of light around…
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